





KVSEV:A Secure In-Memory Key-Value Store with Secure Encrypted Virtualization

<u>Junseung You</u>, Kyeongryong Lee, Hyungon Moon, Yeongpil Cho, Yunheung Paek

Santa Cruz, USA October 31-November 1, 2023










User data is exposed to adversarial insiders in cloud












User data is exposed to adversarial insiders in cloud












- User data is exposed to adversarial insiders in cloud
- Hardware-based security supports












- User data is exposed to adversarial insiders in cloud
- Hardware-based security supports
 - Provide trusted execution environment in remote server(s)












- User data is exposed to adversarial insiders in cloud
- Hardware-based security supports
 - Provide trusted execution environment in remote server(s)










Trusted Key-Value Stores with SEV



Secure Processor (SP) manages per-VM encryption keys










Trusted Key-Value Stores with SEV



Secure Processor (SP) manages per-VM encryption keys

Provides confidentiality and integrity from malicious VMs and hypervisor










Trusted Key-Value Stores with SEV



Secure Processor (SP) manages per-VM encryption keys

Provides confidentiality and integrity from malicious VMs and hypervisor


No integrity protection from physical adversaries












DRAM traffic is encrypted












- DRAM traffic is encrypted
 - Need collaborator to control when and what to inject












- DRAM traffic is encrypted
 - Need collaborator to control when and what to inject
- Temporal (when) precision is limited
 - Single instruction (single stepping)
 - Multiple instructions












- DRAM traffic is encrypted
 - Need collaborator to control when and what to inject
- Temporal (when) precision is limited
 - Single instruction (single stepping)
 - Multiple instructions
- Low temporal precision → targets k-v pairs
 - Arbitrary corruption












- DRAM traffic is encrypted
 - Need collaborator to control when and what to inject
- Temporal (when) precision is limited
 - Single instruction (single stepping)
 - Multiple instructions
- Low temporal precision → targets k-v pairs
 - Arbitrary corruption












- DRAM traffic is encrypted
 - Need collaborator to control when and what to inject
- Temporal (when) precision is limited
 - Single instruction (single stepping)
 - Multiple instructions
- Low temporal precision → targets k-v pairs
 - Arbitrary corruption
 - Rollback












- DRAM traffic is encrypted
 - Need collaborator to control when and what to inject
- Temporal (when) precision is limited
 - Single instruction (single stepping)
 - Multiple instructions
- Low temporal precision → targets k-v pairs
 - Arbitrary corruption
 - Rollback












- DRAM traffic is encrypted
 - Need collaborator to control when and what to inject
- Temporal (when) precision is limited
 - Single instruction (single stepping)
 - Multiple instructions
- Low temporal precision → targets k-v pairs
 - Arbitrary corruption
 - Rollback












- Merkle tree (MT)
 - SW-only data structure for data integrity












- Merkle tree (MT)
 - SW-only data structure for data integrity











Merkle tree (MT)


- SW-only data structure for data integrity
- Update on PUT, verify on GET











Merkle tree (MT)

- SW-only data structure for data integrity
- Update on PUT, verify on GET


Problem











Merkle tree (MT)

- SW-only data structure for data integrity
- Update on PUT, verify on GET


Problem











Merkle tree (MT)

- SW-only data structure for data integrity
- Update on PUT, verify on GET


Problem











Merkle tree (MT)

- SW-only data structure for data integrity
- Update on PUT, verify on GET


Problem











Merkle tree (MT)

- SW-only data structure for data integrity
- Update on PUT, verify on GET


Problem











Merkle tree (MT)

- SW-only data structure for data integrity
- Update on PUT, verify on GET

Problem










Time

 t_2



DRAM

Merkle tree (MT)

- SW-only data structure for data integrity
- Update on PUT, verify on GET

Problem

Replay MT with k-v pair


Returns outdated value 'v' passing Merkle tree verification












Observation 1











Observation 1










Secure / unmodifiable



Observation 1










Secure / unmodifiable




Observation 1












Observation 1











Observation 1

 If Merkle root is secure, modifying/ replaying internal nodes will be detected during root computation

Observation 2


 Different encryption keys are used for respective VMs











Observation 1

 If Merkle root is secure, modifying/ replaying internal nodes will be detected during root computation

Observation 2


 Different encryption keys are used for respective VMs











Observation 1

 If Merkle root is secure, modifying/ replaying internal nodes will be detected during root computation

Observation 2


- Different encryption keys are used for respective VMs
- Secure channel btw. VMs and SP











DRAM

Observation 1

 If Merkle root is secure, modifying/ replaying internal nodes will be detected during root computation

Observation 2

 Different encryption keys are used for respective VMs

Socure channel btw VMs and SP


Idea: Use different VM encryption keys to secure Merkle root












 Use short-lived VMs as secure storage for MT root












 Use short-lived VMs as secure storage for MT root












- Use short-lived VMs as secure storage for MT root
 - Different Auth-VM to store MT root on every root update
 - Different encryption keys











- Use short-lived VMs as secure storage for MT root
 - Different Auth-VM to store MT root on every root update
 - Different encryption keys


- Calculate root_{new}
- Store $root_{new}$ in new Auth VM











AMD SP

DRAM

- Use short-lived VMs as secure storage for MT root
 - Different Auth-VM to store MT root on every root update
 - Different encryption keys


- Calculate root_{new}
- Store $root_{new}$ in new Auth VM











- Use short-lived VMs as secure storage for MT root
 - Different Auth-VM to store MT root on every root update
 - Different encryption keys


- Calculate root_{new}
- Store $root_{new}$ in new Auth VM











- Use short-lived VMs as secure storage for MT root
 - Different Auth-VM to store MT root on every root update
 - Different encryption keys


- Calculate root_{new}
- Store $root_{new}$ in new Auth VM











AMD SP

DRAM

- Use short-lived VMs as secure storage for MT root
 - Different Auth-VM to store MT root on every root update
 - Different encryption keys


- Calculate root_{new}
- Store root_{new} in new Auth VM
- **GET** verify MT root











DRAM

- Use short-lived VMs as secure storage for MT root
 - Different Auth-VM to store MT root on every root update
 - Different encryption keys


- Calculate root_{new}
- Store root_{new} in new Auth VM
- **GET** verify MT root








































































- Additional Protections
 - (Issue 1) Integrity of new key-value pair(s)









- Additional Protections
 - (Issue 1) Integrity of new key-value pair(s)
 - → Solution: verify before/after writing to database









- (Issue 1) Integrity of new key-value pair(s)
 - → Solution: verify before/after writing to database
- (Issue 2) Protecting new Merkle root









- (Issue 1) Integrity of new key-value pair(s)
 - → Solution: verify before/after writing to database
- (Issue 2) Protecting new Merkle root
 - → Solution: obscuring physical location of calculated Merkle root









- (Issue 1) Integrity of new key-value pair(s)
 - → Solution: verify before/after writing to database
- (Issue 2) Protecting new Merkle root
 - → Solution: obscuring physical location of calculated Merkle root
- (Issue 3) Protecting Merkle root calculation









- (Issue 1) Integrity of new key-value pair(s)
 - → Solution: verify before/after writing to database
- (Issue 2) Protecting new Merkle root
 - → Solution: obscuring physical location of calculated Merkle root
- (Issue 3) Protecting Merkle root calculation
 - → Solution: reserved register to hold intermediate nodes









Additional Protections

- (Issue 1) Integrity of new key-value pair(s)
 - → Solution: verify before/after writing to database
- (Issue 2) Protecting new Merkle root
 - → Solution: obscuring physical location of calculated Merkle root
- (Issue 3) Protecting Merkle root calculation
 - → Solution: reserved register to hold intermediate nodes

Optimizations

- Eager Auth-VM creation
- VM debloating
- Asynchronous verification









Additional Protections

- (Issue 1) Integrity of new key-value pair(s)
 - → Solution: verify before/after writing to database
- (Issue 2) Protecting new Merkle root
 - → Solution: obscuring physical location of calculated Merkle root
- (Issue 3) Protecting Merkle root calculation
 - → Solution: reserved register to hold intermediate nodes

Optimizations

- Eager Auth-VM creation
- VM debloating
- Asynchronous verification

Please refer to the paper for details










Standalone Evaluation

KVSEV performs

- (Baseline) 13.38x 64.23x slower than native KVS
- Similar numbers across varying number of threads, value size, KVS size












Standalone Evaluation

KVSEV performs

- (Baseline) 13.38x 64.23x slower than native KVS
- Similar numbers across varying number of threads, value size, KVS size













Impact of Optimizations

KVSEV improves performance by

- 2.3x with eager VM creation
- **5.7x** with asynchronous verification
- 14x with Auth VM debloating (151.1 VMs/s → 2156.3 VMs/s)














- KVSEV performs better than ShieldStore by
 - 1.47x when accommodating large number of key-value pairs












- KVSEV performs better than ShieldStore by
 - 1.47x when accommodating large number of key-value pairs












- KVSEV performs better than ShieldStore by
 - 1.47x when accommodating large number of key-value pairs












- KVSEV performs better than ShieldStore by
 - 1.47x when accommodating large number of key-value pairs











Summary

KVSEV is a secure in-memory KVS with AMD SEV

 KVSEV protects KVS from physical adversaries by using ephemeral VMs as safe storage for SW-only Merkle tree roots









KVSEV:A Secure In-Memory Key-Value Store with Secure Encrypted Virtualization

<u>Junseung You</u>, Kyeongryong Lee, Hyungon Moon, Yeongpil Cho, Yunheung Paek

Santa Cruz, USA October 31-November 1, 2023

